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摘要 
Miller & Modigliani (1961) 提出了股利无关理论并认为公司的股利政策无关紧要。然而，
后续的研究已经表明股利政策确实至关重要，且公司不同的股利政策会导致市场的不同
反应。当前，已经建立的相关理论也表明，股利政策是公司董事会在现代公司设置中用
来保护外部投资者利益的治理工具之一。本文预期将得到如下结论，在其他所有条件相
同的情况下，董事会改革会改善公司董事会有效运用股利政策的能力，使之成为一个有
效的治理工作，尽可能的减少代理问题。 
利用来自 35 个不同国家的数据，本文发现，董事会改革与公司是否发放股利、发放股利
的数额大小存在着正相关关系。本文还发现，在投资者保护薄弱的国家，董事会改革和
股利政策之间的正相关关系将显著减弱。这些发现支持了 La Porta et al. (2000) 利用产出模
型得到的结论，La Porta 等人的文章认为股利作为一种公司治理的工具，可以使公司的外
部股东防止公司内部管理者谋取私利。本文的研究结果也表明，董事会改革对股利政策
的影响在很大程度上取决于一个国家的投资者保护水平。在投资者保护力度很强的国家，
董事会改革能够得到有效的执行，以达到预期的效果。在投资者保护薄弱的国家，由于
未能完全执行董事会改革的相关规定，股利政策改革的作用将会减弱。 
 
 
关键词：股利政策；董事会改革；投资者保护；产出模型；股东；公司治理 
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Abstract 
Miller & Modigliani (1961) argued that dividend was irrelevant and implied that dividend policy 
did not matter. However, subsequent studies have shown that dividend policy does matter and that 
the market reacts to dividend policy of firms. It has also been established that dividend policy is 
one of the governance tools used by board of corporations to safeguard the interests of outside 
investors in modern corporate settings. It is expected that, all other things being equal, board 
reforms will improve the ability and the capacity of the board of corporations to effectively use 
dividend policy as a governance tool in reducing agency problems as far as possible. 
Using data from 36 diverse countries, I find evidence that board reforms are positively associated 
with increased likelihood of firms to pay dividends and the amount of dividends paid. I also find 
that the positive association between board reforms and dividend policy is more pronounced in 
countries with stronger legal enforcement institutions. I interpret these findings as being 
supportive of the Outcome Model by La Porta et al., (2000) which sees dividend policy as a 
corporate governance tool used by shareholders to prevent corporate insiders from engaging in 
selfish activities. It also means that the impact of board reforms on dividend policy is, to large 
extent, dependent on how laws that protect investors are enforced in a country. Where legal 
enforcement institutions are strong, board reforms can be effectively enforced to achieve their 
desired outcomes. In countries with weak legal enforcement institutions, the impact of board 
reforms on dividend policy is attenuated due to deficiencies in enforcing the provisions in board 
reforms. 
 
Keywords: Dividend policy; Board reforms; legal enforcement; Outcome model; Shareholders; 
Corporate governance 
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CHAPTER 1 BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
Introduction 
In a competitive world where countries are jostling to attract and maintain corporate investments, 
corporate reforms have become a common tool used by governments the world over to address 
the concerns of owners of capital. Evidence around the world suggests that countries, irrespective 
of their levels of economic development or the origins of their laws, carry out board reforms from 
time to time. Board reforms take different forms but generally, they are envisaged to improve the 
protection of outside shareholders (Kim and Lu, 2013). According to (Fauver et al., 2017), 
countries usually concentrate on boards reforms because “Boards are the fundamental governance 
mechanism of corporations and because board reforms are the major approach to address corporate 
governance issues”. There are arguments for and against board reforms. On one hand, the 
argument is that, left to corporate insiders alone, necessary board reforms needed to reduce 
expropriation of outside investors by controlling shareholders and managers will be left undone 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Accordingly, board reforms are justifiable and necessary. On the 
other hand, some argue that a board structure is a market determination and any reforms 
precipitated by external forces are unnecessary and potentially costly. 
Empirically, there have been studies on the impact of board reforms on firm value and the findings 
have been anything but conclusive. Black & Khanna,2007; Dahya & Mcconnel,2007; Black & 
Kim,2012 established that board reforms increase firm value in India, the United Kingdom and 
South Korea, respectively. On the other hand, Zhang, 2007 and Li, 2014 argue that board reforms 
rather reduce firm value in the United States of America. Whilst the afore-mentioned studies on 
board reforms have concentrated on single countries, Fauver et al., (2017) carried out a 
comprehensive worldwide study involving 41 countries and concluded that board reforms increase 
firm value. They do state, however, that different types of board reforms have different impact on 
firm value.1 They opine that the subsequent changes in board independence as result of board 
reforms are crucial in explaining the effectiveness of board reforms. They did not find a country’s 
legal origin to play any role in their study.  
These findings in previous studies suggest that board reforms will likely impact other areas of 
corporate governance. This study explores one of such areas: The impact of board reforms on 
                                                          
1 They did not find reforms related to chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) separation to have any significant 
impact on firm value. They suggest that reforms that involve more representation from outside is more effective. 
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dividend policy. Dividend policy has been shown to be one of the key governance tools used by 
board of corporations to reduce the incidence of agency costs. Away from the earlier works of 
Modgliani & Miller in 1958 and 1961, which argued that a firm’s dividend policy had no impact 
on shareholder value, subsequent works have shown that firms do pursue deliberate dividend 
policies. Dividend policy is used to prevent managers from engaging in activities that are 
detrimental to shareholders. According to this reasoning, by giving profits to owners in the form 
of dividends, corporate insiders would be prevented from using corporate earnings for their selfish 
gains. Esterbrook, (1984) further states that the payment of dividend forces firms to seek funding 
from the capital markets which exposes corporate insiders to further scrutiny and control of 
corporate insiders. 
 La Porta et al., (2000) made two propositions to explain why and how boards use dividend policy 
as a corporate governance tool. The two models are the Outcome Model and the Substitution 
Model. In simple terms, the Outcome Model states that dividends are an outcome of effective 
protection of shareholders. The implication is that in environments where the protection of 
shareholders is strong, firms will pay high dividends and vice versa. The Substitution Model on 
the hand, says that dividends are substitutes for weak investor protection. Accordingly, the 
Substitution Model predicts high dividend payments in environments where investor protection is 
weak and vice versa. 
The two models predict two contradictory effects board reforms could potentially have on dividend 
policy. If board reforms improve corporate governance and  boost the protection of investors as 
they are intended to (Kim and Lu, 2013), then they should lead to larger and smaller dividend 
payments   according to the Outcome Model and the Substitution Model, respectively. Whether 
there exists a strong investor protection in a country prior to board reforms or not, countries embark 
on board reforms with the intention of providing better protection to outside shareholders. The 
impact of board reforms on dividend policy should therefore, be assessed primarily from how they 
improve corporate governance of corporations although their potential impact is likely to be 
affected by a country’s legal enforcement institutions. How these reforms interact with legal 
enforcement institutions in a country will determine the magnitude and extent of the impact. 
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The question is: If board reforms strengthen corporate governance, should dividend payments 
increase or decrease?2 In other words, the question of interest here is whether the Outcome Model 
or Substitution Model prevails when assessing the impact of board reforms on corporate dividend 
policy. This presents an interesting setting for an empirical study. 
This study uses data from 36 diverse countries to answer this empirical question. It was found that 
board reforms positively impact both the decision to pay dividend and the amount of dividend paid. 
It was also found that the impact and statistical significance of the positive association varies across 
countries; with the impact in countries with stronger legal enforcement institutions being more 
pronounced. This study uses the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and the Logistic models to  examine 
the effect of board reforms on the likelihood of firms to pay dividend and the level of dividend 
paid. Firm, industry and country effects are included in all regressions. In addition, various firm-
level and country-level controls are included to ensure that the results are not affected by any 
confounding factors. As is common in international studies, it is plausible that results would be 
unduly influenced by big countries. In further robustness checks, analyses were done without the 
dominant country, the United States of America, which account for about 33% of the sample. 
Different measures of the dependable variables were also used in the analyses and the results were 
unaffected in all cases. 
This study contributes to literature in a number of ways. As far as can be determined, this is the 
first empirical study that examines the impact of board reforms on dividend policy at the global 
level. As has been pointed out by Frankfurter & Wood, 2002 and Baker & Weigand, 2015, no one 
theory can adequately explain dividend policy. This means that the dividend conundrum is more 
or less an empirical issue and this study attempts to contribute in this direction. This study provides 
evidence to support the Outcome Model in that reforms put boards in a better position to effectively 
use dividend policy as a tool to protect the interests of outside investors. This study empirically 
documents that board reforms are positively related to the amount of dividends firms pay and the 
likelihood of firms to pay dividends. This study also shows that the level of legal enforcement in 
a country impacts this positive relationship between board reforms and dividend policy. The 
association was found to be more pronounced in countries above the median of the two indexes 
used in this study: Anti-director index and the rule of law. This study also provides evidence that 
                                                          
2 Tse (2004) has called into question the essence of using large dividends to decrease agency costs in well-governed 
firms. Dey (2008), however, is of the opinion that the incidence of agency conflicts is more likely in well-governed 
firms. 
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reforms that lead to more outside representation are more effective than internal changes such as 
the separation of chairman and CEO roles. This supports the findings of Fauver et al., 2017.  
Second, this study contributes to the increasing number of studies that examine the impact of 
governance reforms at the global level. In so doing, this study follows Fauver et al., 2017 who 
studies the impact of board reforms on firm value using worldwide data. Most studies that examine 
the impact of external changes in governance on firms have typically been in single countries. In 
this way, the study provides opportunity to researchers, investors, policy makers and others alike 
to analyze how board reforms could impact dividend policy in a global context.   
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Literature review and hypotheses development are 
presented in section 2 research methodology is described in section 3. Results and discussion are 
reported in section 4 and section 5 contains summary and conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Board reforms, agency costs and dividend policy 
Researchers over the years have tried to understand what factors influence a firm’s dividend policy. 
Some pioneers in this line of research are Lintner (1956) and Modigliani & Miller (1958, 1961). 
Early works on dividend policy of firms by Lintner & Modigliani and Miller yielded, to a large 
extent, contrary findings. Whilst Lintner found that firms pursued well-thought out dividend 
policies, Modgliani & Miller asserted that the wealth of shareholders are not impacted by the 
dividend policies that firms pursue. This is what led to the Dividend Puzzle by Black (1976). 
Works following these pioneering works have naturally sought to unravel what factors, if any, 
influence a firm’s dividend policy. Some scholars have used a firm’s life cycle (example DeAngelo 
et al., 2006 and Fama and French, 2001) and taxes (see for example Mock and Yeung, 2005; 
Masulis and Trueman, 1988; Poterba and Summers, 1984; Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1979; 
Elton and Gruber, 1970; Brennan, 1970), to explain dividend policy.  
A number of theories have also been deduced over the years to explain dividend policy: The 
clientele effect, the catering hypothesis, and the bird-in-hand theory. These theories attempt to 
explain dividend policies from the perspective of behavioral or investor sentiment approach and 
some of the works that have been done in this area include Miller & Modigliani, 1961; Allen et al., 
2000; Baker & Wurgler, 2004; and Li & Lie, 2006). Healy & Palepu, 1989; Lang & Litzenberger, 
1989; Benartzi et al., 1997; and Jo & Pan, 2009 have tackled dividend policy from the signaling 
perspective. Agency theory states that the managers may be interested in policies and investments 
that are not in the best interests of outside shareholders. In the modern corporate setting, it is the 
responsibility of the board of directors to hold managers in check and safeguard the interests of 
these shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983). One way the board carries 
out this role is by ensuring that corporate insiders pay out profits to outside shareholders in the 
form of dividends (La Porta et al., 2000). 
La Porta et al., 2000 propose two models to explain how agency cost impacts dividend policy: The 
Outcome Model and the Substitution Model. The Outcome Model sees dividend policy as a 
mechanism to prevent corporate insiders from pursuing selfish interests by way of excessive 
salaries, asset sales to themselves or other entities they control, unfair transfer pricing with 
affiliated corporations, pursuing personal interests with corporate resources or even outright theft. 
Owners do this by making sure that corporate insiders disgorge cash in the form of higher 
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dividends. The Substitution Model on the other hand implies that corporate insiders use dividend 
payouts as a signal to outside investors that they will not be expropriated. In essence, dividends 
are used as a substitute for legal protection. 
The first attempt to establish dividend policy as a corporate governance tool was by Roseff (1982). 
In his study, he espoused that dividend payments reduce agency problems caused by free cash flow 
as proposed by Jensen (1986). In recent times, a number of studies that use mainly American data 
have found support for the Substitution Model. Jiraporn & Ning, 2006; Officer, 2006; Jiraporn & 
Chintrakam, 2009; Jo & Pan, 2009; John et al., 2015 have concluded that dividend policy is 
positively related to weak governance. In addition, Hu & Kumar, 2004 found dividend policy to 
be positively impacted by managerial entrenchment. As has been pointed out by Smith et al., 2017, 
studies set in international settings, however, tend to support the Outcome Model (See La Porta et 
al., 2000; Gugler, 2003; Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003 and Adjaoud & Ben-Amar, 2010).3  
The question of how board reforms impact dividend policy will be answered in the context of how 
board reforms impact corporate governance and therefore, agency costs. If board reforms improves 
corporate governance and help reduce agency costs, then it is expected that board reforms will be 
negatively related to dividend policy. This would support the view of Tse (2004) who questions 
the wisdom in using large dividends to reduce agency costs in well-governed firms. Dey (2008), 
however, opines that the incidence of agency conflicts is more likely even in well-governed firms. 
It is critical to state that board reforms do not by themselves address agency costs or legal 
environments in which firms operate. They seek to empower the board of corporations to protect 
the interests of investors (especially minority investors) from exploitation from corporate insiders 
and to improve financial reporting transparency (Fauver et al., 2017).It is expected that, all other 
things being equal, board reforms will improve the ability and the capacity of the board of 
corporations to use all corporate governance tools and mechanisms (including dividend policy) in 
reducing agency problems as far as possible. In this respect, if dividends could be used to reduce 
agency costs as has been argued, then board reforms will increase the likelihood and levels of 
dividends that firms pay. This leads to the first testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. Board reform is positively associated with the likelihood and the levels of dividend 
payments. 
                                                          
3 Hartford et al., 2008 and Jiraporn et al., 2011 have evidence that support the Outcome Model using American 
data. 
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2.2 Board reforms, legal enforcement and dividend policy 
Extant literature has established that the legal environments in which investors operate differ from 
one country to the other. This means that the impact of board reforms on dividend policy will 
likely be affected by how individual countries enforce laws that safeguard the interests of investors. 
La Porta et al., (2000) provide evidence that dividend payouts are higher in countries that have 
more effective and efficient legal protection to outside investors. It is therefore, expected the 
positive relationship between board reforms and dividend payouts around the world will differ 
from one country to the other. To date, a number of studies have found evidence in support of the 
Outcome Model in  explaining the relationship between agency costs a firm’s dividend policy (See 
for example Bartram et al. 2012; Brockman and Unlu, 2009; Byrne and O’Conner, 2012; Jiraporn 
et al., 2011; Mitton, 2004; Shao et al., 2013 etc.). Whether firms will initiate dividend payments 
and how much to pay, is dependent on how much outside shareholders are able to use their legal 
rights to coerce firms. La Porta et al (2000) have established that dividend payouts are a result of 
country-level legal protection that a country affords outside investors whilst Mitton (2004) also 
points out that dividend payments are an outcome of effective corporate governance and that more 
effective corporate governance systems and stronger shareholder rights result in larger dividend 
payouts. These points are buttressed by Truong & Heany, 2007 who state that minority 
shareholders are more effective in exercising their rights to protect themselves against 
expropriation in countries where legal protection is strong.  This leads to the next testable 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The impact of board reforms on dividend policy is more pronounced in countries 
with stronger legal enforcement institutions.  
2.3 Research gap and contribution 
Studies that have explored the impact of reforms on firms have generally concentrated on firm 
value and have been mainly conducted in single countries. The results from these studies have 
been mixed at best. In this study, I use data from 36 diverse countries to assess the impact of board 
reforms on dividend policy, one of the most important topics in corporate governance research. I 
also conduct tests on the various components of reforms namely, board independence, audit 
committee and auditor independence, chairman and CEO role and non-board reform, to ascertain 
which component and/or components  of board reforms is/are responsible for the impact. By so 
doing, I hope to have overcome the deficiency of conducting such studies in a single country.  
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This section explains the source of data, the sample, how the various variables are constructed as 
well as the research design. 
3.1 Data and sample description 
This study relies on the information collected by Fauver et al.,(2017) on major corporate 
governance reforms from 1990 through 2012 in their work titled, “Board Reforms and firm value: 
Worldwide evidence”.4 In their study, they cite reports from the World Bank, European Corporate 
Governance Institute (ECGI), local stock market exchange regulators, and prior studies as their 
main sources. Governance reforms are classified into two non-mutually groups namely, reforms 
including board-related components, described as board reforms and reforms which include non-
board-related reforms components, described as non-board reforms. Board reforms are further sub-
grouped into three: Board independence, audit committee and auditor independence and chairman 
and CEO role. 
Reforms are further classified as rule-based or comply or explain. Rule-based reforms are a set of 
legal enactments that require firms to follow specific governance practices. Comply or explain 
reforms are codes of best governance practices that firms have to follow or explain when they fail 
to comply. Table 1 summarizes the various types of reforms used in this study. Table 1 contains a 
list of 41 countries in which reforms were identified to have taken place. Consistent with previous studies, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Greece are dropped because these countries have laws that mandate firms to 
pay out dividends. Czech Republic is also excluded due to limited number of observations. This leaves 36 
countries in the sample.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
                                                          
4 The sample period chosen by the authors coincides with major reforms in several countries. For example, many 
countries began to initiate the enforcement of insider trading laws after 1990 and takeover law reforms were 
promulgated in several European Union countries ( See Bhattacharya & Daouk, 2002; EU, 2004; Lel & Miller, 2015 
and Fauver et al., 2017).    
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